Coronation meetings, Senior British diplomat on Hong Kong, HSBC
A Beijing to Britain briefing
Hello,
Greetings from New Delhi. Walking around the capital of the world’s newly-minted most populous country certainly leaves you with the impression that you are in the midst of a rising superpower. As a multitude of posters and banners remind you, in a couple of months this city will host the G20; papers are full of proper discourse as to how India wants to project itself on the world stage. At the moment, the big geopolitical event here is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which brought foreign ministers from China, Russia and Pakistan to the country. This is an exercise in realpolitik.
With the Coronation Weekend in full flow (congratulations if you are managing to read this with a thumping Pimms-induced headache), this past week saw intense backbench and media criticism of Prime Minister Rishi Sunak and the British Government for allowing China’s vice-president to attend the ceremony. Those against argue to varying degrees that Han Zheng oversaw the dismantling of civil liberties in Hong Kong, that his attendance is a deliberate and disrespectful provocation by China, and that the UK looks weak for allowing it to happen. Others note that this is simply procedure; it is Han’s job to represent China at ceremonial occasions, as his predecessor Wang did likewise.
The episode is illustrative. In one camp, critics of the Government’s China approach in Parliament and Fleet Street lambast it, accusing the Government of paying lip service to protecting and safeguarding Chinese, Hong Kong and British citizens on UK soil, of flip-flopping, and of pursuing a policy of appeasement, and a number of other charges. Why are the so-called Chinese police stations still operating? Why are Confucius Institutes still open? Why have we not yet sanctioned other senior Chinese officials involved in the atrocities in Xinjiang, or the crackdown on civil liberties in Hong Kong? On the other side, the Government seemingly takes the view that this minority of vocal Parliamentarians and media activists don’t really understand geopolitics, can be managed before rebellion builds, and fails to consider the progress that is being made (AUKUS, critical mineral partnerships and Indo-Pacific diplomacy of late, for example). Promises to keep Parliament informed about the decision-making process go unfulfilled, and vague motions around beefing up China capabilities are opaque.
Although these are not equal groupings - one is a disjointed caucus of MPs, Peers, activists, and commentators, the other a Government - both sides have weaknesses in their approaches. Among the critics, almost none have ventured to offer a coherent vision for what they actually want the UK’s relationship with China to look like. Tactical suggestions - such as creating anti-coercion tools - are aplenty, and a largely unified and positive vision for what U.K.-Taiwan relations could look like has been offered. But a strategy is not just a series of small tactical episodes in isolation. Strategy requires assessing the next steps. For example, what would the next step be if Downing Street blocked Han from visiting? How would this have fitted into the role the UK plays within the Five Eyes, or among Pacific partners? Would unaligned powers come to the view that it was a savvy political play? The lack of meaningful discussion on what sort of engagement they would like to see, evidence of thinking through the next steps, and comparisons to 1930s appeasement, means they are sometimes viewed as unserious - a shame, because they are not.
Meanwhile, the Government’s lack of communication and action on security-related matters at home undermines their overall efforts, especially with the rhetoric coming from the intelligence establishment. Given they are now seemingly trying to pursue a realpolitik relationship with China (a term Downing Street’s resident foreign affairs adviser wrote a literal book on), they must evidence to MPs, Peers and the British public that they are taking the security side as seriously as they are seemingly taking the economic push. Why leave Parliament in the dark over the police stations and Confucius Institutes? Why try and facilitate meetings with a Xinjiang official in the UK? Why invite Hong Kong politicians over when it has been stated that the PRC is in violation of the Joint Declaration? Foreign Secretary James Cleverly can get huffy about how certain British politicians seemingly don’t understand diplomacy - but how are they meant to understand and support the Government’s approach if so much of it is never communicated, and seen as largely unaccountable? Constantly having to be dragged into acting on domestic security matters is not realpolitik; it creates the general impression that the Government does not want to rock the boat for fear of damaging economic relations between London and Beijing. As the UK enters a new chapter in its relationship with China, the Government would do well to remember the importance of clear, concise and proactive communication: after all, a truth, poorly expressed, is a lie. And there is much to be positive about.
India is set to be one of the winners in this new era of multipolarity: a hugely exciting prospect for this country. In this new epoch, Parliament and Government will have to look at the UK’s standing in the world through the harsh, painful lens of realpolitik. But as New Delhi evidenced this week - welcoming foreign ministers from India’s two most significant regional concerns - realpolitik is the default for most countries. It’s time Westminster got to grips with what that means.
— Sam Hogg, Editor
In this week’s Briefing Note, we look at:
Diplomacy around the Coronation
A senior British diplomat on Hong Kong
HSBC results