Hello,
The clip below comes from the film Margin Call. Set in the early stages of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the film focuses on 24 hours at a large investment bank, believed to be loosely based on the Lehman Brothers. In this scene, the leadership of the bank is being briefed in the wee hours of the morning by a junior analyst on the massive risk they have acquired through investing in mortgage-backed securities.
The story culminates in a high-stakes decision to mitigate the damage at a great moral, reputational and business cost. The scene has stuck with me for several reasons:
A complex issue is identified, and when the severity of it is understood, it is escalated rapidly; while senior officials try to explain it to the leader using corporate terminology and references to a briefing pack, the clearest explanation comes from the person able to convey it like they are talking to a “young child, or a golden retriever.”
The issue - the risk acquired from the mortgage-backed securities they hold on their books - is not exaggerated nor downplayed. It is presented in clinical terms, and the nature of its sheer size makes the case for action. Crucially, everyone in the room understands the nature of the issue - they are clued into the technicalities.
The leader of the investment bank - John Tuld, played by the excellent Jeremy Irons - quickly grasps the situation. Having had the assessment, Tuld fields views from his directors. He quickly hones in on what needs to happen, weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of action and inaction.
Finally, when the decision is taken to clear the house of the MBS when the market opens, he explains to his team why he is taking this decision. He accepts criticism as to what it will look like - how it will damage the firm’s reputation irreversibly, how it could be ethically wrong - counters these, then acts.
Why does this matter? I want to use this year’s concluding note as a chance to sit around the virtual boardroom with you, like in Margin Call, and set out what I have observed from speaking, reading and thinking about this bilateral every single day for three years. The chances are that if you’re reading this, you are interested in how Britain responds to the return of China as a superpower. Many of you work in senior positions with access to information and insights others don’t have, in jobs that are several rungs ahead of where I would be in a conventional company. In this case, it may help if you think of yourself as one of those directors gathered around the table from the clip above. I am very much a junior analyst and will try and deliver my assessments objectively, based on what I have observed from the information available to me, which is naturally not all the information that sits in the wider system.
Here are the critical points I will raise in this note:
The UK does not set the geopolitical timeline anymore, and in the current timeline, it is lagging behind its partners and allies when it comes to strategising - and creating actual tools - around how to manage healthy competition and national security issues with China. Almost everyone I speak to is aware of this: politicians, Whitehall officials, CEOs or foreign diplomats
A China Strategy of sorts sits within the top levels of Government. However, 99% of politicians, researchers and civil servants will never see the entire strategy in full. Instead, when asked about this strategy, the Government defers to either the Integrated Review Refresh, or most commonly, to its Three Pillars (3P) - Protect, Align, Engage - approach.
Many politicians interested in foreign, security, climate or industrial strategy can see China is going to be the major issue of the next decade. They are frustrated that when they push the Government for strategic clarity, they are rebutted with a defensive response anchored around the 3P approach, which is not a strategy in any meaningful sense of the word when compared to what other countries have published. Increasingly too, emotive language in debates or criticising the Government or private sector companies in newspapers doesn’t seem to move the dial for politicians.
Companies I speak to share a similar frustration with the Government’s inability to further outline the approach and to set out the ‘red lines’ clearly, primarily because they find the inconsistency adds another complication to their operations. Most want stability and some have begun to look ahead to a Labour Government rather than allocate too many resources to dealing with this current administration.
The UK has begun to invest in its China capabilities within Westminster: but the amount of funding is too little and, more critically, it lacks a champion and someone to inject energy and focus into achieving capabilities at scale.
If the UK had ten stable years in which to restructure and build the capabilities it needs - and China was magically paused in time - it could accomplish it. However, it does not. 2024 will see Indian, Taiwanese, and critically American elections among many others. The latter will divert resources, bandwidth and attention away from China at a critical moment for the UK, leaving it lagging even further behind other countries. There is a clear and present danger that this work slips lower down the priority scale.
However, I also want to share some ideas as to how these areas could improve in the coming years, and what government ministers, civil service leaders and FTSE100 CEOs should be looking out for. In this end-of-year note, we will look at four areas:
Downing Street and China
Parliament and China
Whitehall and China
The media and China
- Sam Hogg, Founder
DOWNING STREET AND CHINA
What has the British Government achieved over the last year concerning China, the so-called “epoch defining challenge”? In isolation, not a huge amount: one major speech, two senior visits to China, and a handful of semi-relevant laws being passed. Little suggests that Prime Minister Rishi Sunak has any particular interest in the China relationship beyond tweaking legislation and reacting to issues as and when they arise. While the United States has ploughed on with sanctions, the IRA and the CHIPS ACT, the European Union has passed an anti-economic coercion tool into existence and published a China Strategy, the British Government has often seemed under-funded, muddling through it, and without a driving strategy that properly combines domestic, industrial and foreign policy. It’s worth noting from the outset that outside the political channels, businesses continue to navigate the relationship from both sides, and trade continues to rise, so some could have the view that the UK has actually managed the relationship fairly well.
But bilateral relationships are impacted by the wider world in which they exist: to this extent, Downing Street has tried to work closely with several nations to make sure it is close to singing from the same hymn sheet when it comes to matters around China. This year alone, the United Kingdom signed several critical bilateral agreements and worked within the G7 to harden language around issues such as economic coercion and illegal fishing (an issue close to the hearts of many Indo-Pacific countries.) In the first half of the year, five major critical mineral partnerships were agreed upon with some friends old and new. In the latter half, the United Kingdom hosted a state visit from South Korea and strengthened relations with Japan and Italy on military issues. The AUKUS partnership between the US, UK and Australia is making progress, with much of what Pillar Two covers will see progress on quantum technologies through to undersea cable security. And despite criticism, the Government was receptive early on to warnings coming from the Artificial Intelligence sector, and managed to bring together an international conference on AI Safety which saw all the major global players attend, including the United States and China - the first of its kind.
In his recent book discussing the evolution of conflict from 1945 to the Ukraine War, General David Petraeus outlined four ideas leaders must grasp to work strategically:
Leaders must be able to assess the situation before them and craft an appropriate strategic response. In short, they need to get the big ideas right.
They must then be able to communicate the strategy effectively throughout their organisation and to external stakeholders.
They need to be able to oversee the implementation of the strategy, driving the execution of the campaign plan relentlessly and determinedly.
Finally, they must be able to revisit, refine and recommunicate 1), 2) and 3) as the situation develops.
Measured against these, it is fair to argue Prime Minister Rishi Sunak has largely failed to reassure Parliament that his Government is taking a strategic approach to its relationship with China. Downing Street continues to either not care about, account for or communicate with (these don’t have to be mutually exclusive) Parliamentary feelings on several China issues. During his campaign, Rishi Sunak promised to close Confucius Institutes. This has not transpired, and although a popular idea in Parliament, it’s been fairly clear that the UK feared reciprocal action against the British Council if it acted. Puzzlingly for a party that loves Free Market Principles, the Government has done nothing substantial to encourage competitors to Confucius Institutes to emerge, and constantly underfunds China capability initiatives throughout Westminster and Whitehall, including making all departments bid for the small pot of money available to this end.
Downing Street has failed to reassure Parliamentarians and the public it has done meaningful work on transnational repression too, despite various TV shows and newspaper articles documenting cases at universities and within the diaspora throughout the UK. Deferring to the opaque ‘Defending Democracy Taskforce’ does not seem to cut the mustard. Likewise, when a Government Minister revealed in passing that Chinese firm BGI Group (sanctioned by the US Government for its role in Xinjiang) had been behind a hacking campaign against the NHS’s genetic data centre years before it was awarded a Covid-19 testing contract, politicians reacted with justified shock and anger. What action would the Government be taking to remedy this, they asked? Within a couple of hours, the Government had amended the record to say they didn’t recognise this characterisation, and despite constant campaigning, have provided no meaningful updates on any action around BGI Group.
Even when it does seek to positively tie economic security and foreign policy together - such as seeking views on how it should tweak the landmark National Security and Investment Act - the public relations push is undermined by the Government’s perceived weakness on similar issues. The conversation goes from being ‘the Government is looking to alter this legislation to reflect feedback and new ideas’ to ‘the Government is watering down this legislation.’ Fundamentally, nothing in this Government’s approach to China feels ‘strategic’.
The lack of focus on China from Downing Street reflects a wider lack of focus on almost anything other than working towards winning a General Election at some point this year. In the most stable of times, Sunak had a limited interest in foreign affairs. These are not the most stable of times. Taiwanese, Indian, and particularly American elections will suck up a huge amount of resources and bandwidth in the coming year at a time when the Government desperately needs to be focussing on building the UK’s resilience and capabilities concerning China. The potential return of Donald Trump, probably supported by Nikki Haley as Vice President, will cause massive headaches for whoever is in Downing Street. Expect inflamed trade wars (with an impact on the UK), discussion of a withdrawal from NATO, and sustained (and valid) criticism from Washington of European nations for underspending on their defence. All of this will distract from building China capabilities, leaving the UK further behind its allies and partners - despite the Government admitting a handful of months ago that it “recognise[s] that further investment in capabilities will be needed to ensure the government is equipped with the tools, expertise and knowledge to respond to the systemic challenge that China poses to the United Kingdom’s security, prosperity, and values.”
The reality is that this time next year, we are likely to be discussing Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s first couple of weeks or months in Downing Street. To that end, understanding what’s driving Labour’s thinking on China, and what a Labour Government’s China approach could look like remain two of the questions we are asked most frequently. The party’s plan to audit UK-China relations and its new approach to economic policy dubbed ‘Securonomics’ will be two of the early flashpoints, but less flashy, ground-up reforms of how the government thinks and talks about China will be essential. In certain ways, Downing Street needs to learn from the private sector in its ability to create new units and ideas and kill them if they don’t add value (for reference, here are the ideas Google has started and ended.)
Here’s what I’m keeping an eye on in the coming months:
CPTPP: The Government will likely be pressed on how it will negotiate China and Taiwan’s applications to join the bloc. It will be interesting to see which groups end up briefing MPs on the technicalities of trade laws, and how they translate that into amendments and pressure on Downing Street.
Election Attack Lines: Domestically, it seems very likely that the Labour Party will strongly attack the Conservative’s relationship with China as the General Election draws closer. A betting man would put money on these attacks being honed around national security, with Labour communications probably utilising previous talking points about the Conservative Government putting national security for sale.
Cybersecurity: In 2021, the Government signed a three-year memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Microsoft called the Digital Transformation Arrangement 2021. It made sense: large technology companies in many ways function like sovereign states, employing huge public affairs teams and astute realpolitik to further their interests. Many of them also face state-backed hacking threats, and to this end, it will be interesting to see if a new Microsoft MoU is signed with further emphasis on state security. Likewise, how quickly will the Government adapt to services like ChatGPT to use internally?
Stripping Gear: The Government is obligated to remove equipment from companies that are forced to comply with China’s Intelligence Law from any sites deemed sensitive, and set out a timetable to do so.
World Votes: In the coming weeks and months, several elections take place.
Election Interference: Taiwan’s will be closely watched in pockets of Westminster, although the prevailing view that it’s all about China doesn’t seem to square away with polling from the island. Regardless, expect to see rhetoric if Beijing reacts to the result by ordering more flyovers or intrusions and intelligence organisations around the world monitoring and learning from Chinese interference in the election.
Democracy and human rights: India’s April election will be watched closely in pockets of Westminster, especially given the role many in the West are hoping India will carve out for itself as a buffer against China. Having been fortunate to spend some time in New Delhi earlier this year, and consequently hear S. Jaishankar, India’s legendary Minister of External Affairs of India, giving a talk on the country’s place in the world, I remain concerned that policymakers are not fully aware of the path India plans to chart for itself.
Trump and Trade: The New York Times recently interviewed Robert Lighthizer, who was the Trump administration’s top trade negotiator and would most likely play a key role in a second-term Presidency should Trump win. The paper reports Trump has said he would “enact aggressive new restrictions on Chinese ownership” of a broad range of assets in the United States, bar Americans from investing in China and phase in a complete ban on imports of key categories of Chinese-made goods like electronics, steel and pharmaceuticals. Lighthizer added more detail on a wide variety of tariffs that could be imposed, with the ultimate aim appearing to be “backing the United States away from integration with the global economy and steering the country toward becoming more self-contained.” As with most decisions under a Trump administration, this will have an impact on whichever leader ends up in Downing Street this time in 12 months. If it’s Labour in power, this will be a major test for their promised boost of the Board of Trade and their pledged inaugural Trade White Paper.
PARLIAMENT AND CHINA
The year opened with the former Foreign Secretary, James Cleverly, delivering a major speech at Mansion House aimed at setting out what the UK’s approach to China is. Building on the recently published Integrated Review Refresh, it set out three pillars, mentioned above: Protect, Align and Engage. Yet to many in Parliament and the Fleet Street papers they talk to, drink and dine with, confusion remains. This is primarily because, despite the Government’s insistence, the 3P approach is not a strategy. It barely covers a page in total, and although the IR Refresh provides some further detail, it’s still not a strategy. The Government may well argue that the China Strategy it has attempted to outline sits within the wider approach it takes to international relations post-IR Refresh, but the lack of a clear, comprehensive public strategy has led some to argue that Downing Street is too weak on China, or in the words of one arch-critic, Iain Duncan Smith, that its approach is “project Kowtow” that “smells of appeasement”. Others, like Labour’s Chris Bryant, used a Parliamentary Committee session to accuse the Foreign Secretary of being a Chinese stooge. Ultimately the best reflection of where the most Parliamentarians sit on the issue can probably be found in the Intelligence and Security Committee’s China report.
Parliament’s year was bookmarked by the arrival of the Integrated Review Refresh, and the news that a researcher had been arrested on charges of allegedly spying for the Chinese Communist Party. Wedged between these two events were several other big moments, including multiple debates on China and related topics like Taiwan, supply chains and economic dependency. With that said, it’s hard to parse exactly why mentions of China fell in Parliament this year by over 10%, and mentions of other related areas were also down. Taiwan was mentioned 40% less, Xinjiang -34%, and Hong Kong -5%.
In terms of what Parliamentarians are discussing publicly when it comes to China, it is again notable how infrequently new Chinese companies were named this year during debates, or how little new legislation passed by the Chinese Government was referenced. Only a small handful of Chinese companies appeared in Hansard for the first time, and that was primarily due to a campaign to get concerns around the Internet of Things (IoT) and Cellular Modules on the radar. Likewise, although China’s National Intelligence Law is often discussed, no other legislation from the Chinese Government was meaningfully referenced in Parliamentary debates. Despite this, Parliamentarians of all major parties took part in a number of China-related campaigns: letters were sent and questions drafted on the issues of BGI Group, Cellular Modules, protecting the steel industry, unfreezing savings belonging to thousands of Hongkongers, Chinese electric vehicles arriving into the United Kingdom, and TikTok, among other issues.
Two new significant laws came into existence, both of which various collections of MPs and Peers can correctly claim to have played a role in shaping. The first was the Procurement Act, and the second was the National Security Act. The Government dressed the former as a means of cutting red tape following the UK’s exit from the European Union, but crucially for China hawks it contained the promise of the creation of a new National Security Unit for Procurement, and a timeline for the removal of surveillance equipment produced by companies subject to China’s National Intelligence Law from central government sensitive sites when it comes into effect in late 2024. The latter fully upgraded the UK’s counter-espionage laws, allowing the country to widen the remit for prosecution beyond the limited boundary it had been set under the Official Secrets Act a century ago. In the coming months, it would make sense if we expect to see arrests and stories as the Act is applied. Critically, it also contained a much watered-down Foreign Influence Registration Scheme (FIRS), which will be the focus of many as the new year opens. Additionally, it’s not clear yet how the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act 2023 will play out when it comes to transnational repression at universities, but one suspects we will see parts of it in action too.
I have previously shared my view that this particular cycle of the UK’s relationship with China is one of three eras: the Golden Era, the Alarm Era, and the one we presently sit in, the Shaping Era. As I said at the time, the hallmark of this current era “is that it involves significant strategic considerations about what we want the next decades of UK-China relations to actually look like. What are the strategic red lines? The concessions?” In short: the classic prosperity versus security argument. To ask cutting questions, make strategic speeches and form complex views on this topic requires time, energy and knowledge. Unfortunately, this runs counter to two well-documented issues with British politics, addressed in any number of books from The Spectator’s Isabel Hardman’s ‘Why We Get the Wrong Politicians’ through to numerous anecdotes in Rory Stewart’s recent ‘Politics on the Edge’:
Most of the Government is hidden from backbench MPs by the sheer size of Whitehall. This was best personified in 2022, when the Foreign Affairs Committee asked then-Foreign Secretary Liz Truss where the China Strategy was. Truss - and the Foreign Office’s most senior official, Philip Barton - were confused as to what was being referenced. This limits their ability to scrutinise effectively since so much of the machinery is hidden from sunlight.
The sheer volume of topics MPs are required to talk about, vote on and understand in any given day or week dilutes their ability to have expertise. As Hardman notes in her book, there are few careers in the UK where people meet as wide of a cross-section of society as that of being an MP. Unfortunately, this can mean backbench MPs cannot always afford the time or resources to stay up to date on issues around China, let alone what the British Government is doing in response to them. As a result, they sometimes turn to activist groups to brief or guide them. Unfortunately, there are times when some of those watching from the outside believe there is a significant knowledge gap in what’s being discussed around China in Parliament’s debates and find the language some backbench MPs use to be immature and unrealistic; MPs in turn may have the view that these companies or people have an immature or unrealistic view of what the UK-China bilateral is. A good number of groups, businesses or analysts I’ve spoken to can recount a story of going in to brief certain MPs on a China issue and coming away unimpressed with the level of knowledge or ability to contextualise the information they have been given.
Although politicians’ interest in China has not diminished, puzzlingly, courses and programmes aimed at raising literacy on these issues remain under-resourced and under-attended. Given how many MPs have a strong view of China and related matters, one would expect to see more of them keen to get deeper into the detail. It would be fascinating to see how many of those who frequently speak about China in Parliament have made the time to attend educational programmes such as those put on by the Great Britain China Centre, or allowed their staff to go, for example.
So, how to remedy this? One route would be for Parliamentarians to adapt their questioning to maximise effectiveness in showcasing Government short-sightedness and getting the most from these briefings. Ask questions about China capabilities: how many new positions have been created since the money became available? What are they predominantly focussing on - emerging tech, trade, climate change, defence? What grade are they? How often are Government departments sending staff to China, or other Indo-Pacific countries? What conversations has the Government had about funding alternatives to Confucius Institutes? How much money does it currently budget for Mandarin and Cantonese lessons in the UK? Why has the Government failed to publish X, Y and Z strategy/refresh, when it promised to do so x months ago by y month?
Likewise, for technical debates such as those around electric vehicles or telecommunications, experts could be consulted more frequently so that better, more technical questions can be put to Government Ministers. As Charlie Parton has noted, it’s not hawkish to assess the situation before policymakers and conclude that “there must be decoupling in telecommunications, data, artificial intelligence, quantum computing and most new technologies.” In pushing this, politicians should consult with a wider number of experts who can offer useful insights.
With all this being said, two bright spots are present in Parliament’s discussions around China. First, the Select Committee teams continue to employ talented Mandarin-speaking officials who float between relevant inquiries and sessions, briefing MPs and Peers and creating essential content for them to understand China’s place in the world. Several reports published this year by the Defence, Foreign Affairs, Business and Trade, and other Committees have pushed the conversation further, forcing the Government to explain pressing strategic questions to Parliament. The unit is experimenting with new ideas and will be worth following closely.
Second, Peers have played an indispensable role in properly scrutinising legislation coming through the Houses, utilising their own careers and experiences as references. Having several former Admirals, spy chiefs, diplomats and economists with the time and space to scrutinise ideas properly is valuable, and often looked over as people share videos of MPs delivering snappy social media-ready quips for Twitter clips.
In terms of flashpoints over 2024, it’s again worth reflecting that Parliament will probably look and feel very different this time in 12 months. Hundreds of new MPs will perhaps be settling into their small offices throughout Portcullis House and beyond, and trying to get to grips with what being a professional politician entails. That will significantly alter the membership, influence and size of the varying China-focuses pressure groups that sit in Westminster. Some may expand, some will shrink, and others may fundamentally cease to exist. Parliament’s rhythm will change too, and MPs and Peers could be asked to vote on an entirely new set of Bills and ideas from what we’re currently seeing on the timetable before us.
In terms of what to expect before a General Election in 2024, I would keep an eye on the following:
Understanding China: As readers will know, China faces a multitude of economic issues, including a weak post-COVID recovery, slowing growth, and troubling reports emerging from its property sector. How these issues are digested and spoken about by MPs will be indicative as to what sources they are reading, and which groups are briefing them.
Tech and Elections: Given the view that some British politicians hold around companies like TikTok not being entirely truthful as to their structures, data handling, and algorithms, it seems likely that scrutiny will increase heavily before the election. As an outside punt, it would not be unimaginable in this climate to see a senior official warn specifically about TikTok and algorithm manipulation or something similar.
China-related amendments: The CPTPP Bill is progressing through Parliament. Expect to see amendments put forward by China-focused groups that could include wording around Taiwan, or trade conditions with China.
Future discussions: A number of other Bills are also in the pipeline which all have a China-related dimension to them, and although most won’t progress far, each represents a chance for MPs and Peers to draw attention to the matters at hand. They include: Arm’s-length Bodies (Accountability to Parliament) Bill, Artificial Intelligence (Regulation) Bill [HL], Automated Vehicles Bill [HL], Data Protection and Digital Information Bill, Finance Bill, Genocide (Prevention and Response) Bill [HL], Genocide Determination Bill [HL], International Freedom of Religion or Belief Bill, Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [HL], and the Public Procurement (British Goods and Services) Bill.
Lack of Scrutiny: Parliamentarians, including the Labour and Conservative Chairs of the Business and Trade and Intelligence and Security Committees respectively, are unhappy with the lack of oversight they have been given to the Government’s anti-takeover tools under the NSIA. This may snowball into a wider issue early next year after the NSIA consultation ends.
Wiggle Room: The definition of ‘sensitive’ the Government is trying to set out under the Procurement Act falls short of what many China hawks believed it would be.
WHITEHALL AND CHINA
Whitehall’s workings remain opaque for those who sit outside the structure. Unfortunately, that sentence is true for many who sit inside the structure too. What is clear from conversations I’ve had over the last two years is that on the China front, several changes are underway around attempting to build and streamline China-adjacent teams and capabilities.
External and internal stakeholders are impressed when they engage with small units like the Research Collaboration Advice Team (RCAT) or the Investment Security Unit, which is tasked with scrutinising deals flagged under the National Security and Investment Act. The former has engaged with over 130 institutions and seems likely to grow its team in the coming period, and the latter has played a critical role in helping with eight out of the 15 final orders in the last financial year relating to acquirers with Chinese connections. A review into the NSIA may well see parts of the ISU tweaked too. Likewise, the Ministry of Defence’s Secretary of State’s Office of Net Assessment and Challenge (SONAC) team seems to be impressive.
More generally, the Integrated Review Refresh included a doubling of the China Capabilities Fund to a couple of million, and new positions are being created with China slapped on the job titles. What is not clear is how exactly this money is being spent: which departments are bidding and winning, how are they using the money, and what value these new positions are creating. Certainly, the churn in ministerial appointments does little to help when it comes to setting the direction of travel (and budgets) for small teams within various departments.
This touches on a wider issue for Whitehall, and one that I have written about in Parliamentary evidence and elsewhere several times: there is a lack of incentives to become specialised on China within the Whitehall structure. You can read the view I’ve offered previously, but simply put, you are financially and peer-incentivised to become a generalist in large parts of the civil service which costs the entire establishment dearly because engaging with actual experts remains a weak spot for Whitehall. Setting up a China Expert Group that falls under the remit of the Cabinet Office will not fix this issue (neither will making details of this group despairingly hard to find).
The good news is that this is a structural issue which can be fixed with political willpower and genuine drive. We can learn much from how the Westminster conversation around artificial intelligence has evolved in the last 18 months in policy terms. In the most simple and blunt terms: ChatGPT arrives > policymakers are shocked > AI leaders issue series of warnings > British Government looks at its current AI approach, capabilities, and understanding > British Government forms an expert-led AI Taskforce to replace previous legacy organisations > subject specialists and AI researchers get into special adviser roles > and 18 months later, the UK holds an international AI Safety Summit, and can claim to be at the forefront of this evolving conversation.
MEDIA AND CHINA
Last year, I opened this section by observing a timeless quote from American humorist Mark Twain: “It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It’s what you know for sure that just ain’t so.” British media faces an issue similar to those of many other media companies across the Western world: ravaged by falling readership and a wider lack of trust in journalists, they have turned news into entertainment to drum up subscriptions and revenue. Most - but not all - British papers have gone down this route to an extent.
The way many in the British media commentariat understand - and critically editorialise - China also leaves much to be desired, despite them having some of the sharpest foreign correspondents in the game working at the same papers. Coverage of China in the British media is at its most striking when you read a paper, and then go online and read the analysis from academics, experts and research firms whose careers rely on them ‘getting China right’.
Many issues to do with China are covered through the lens of domestic politics and security - which is fair - but then undermined by the journalists going to political or activist sources rather than subject experts for comment, or making small but simple mistakes in the reporting on the issue (we’ve all done this before). This is a problem because reporting on issues around China and national security requires laser-like precision - topics like the work and influence of the United Front Work Department should be covered, scrutinised and highlighted, but require time and resources to do well, especially when the stakes are as high as they are. This is sometimes compounded when think tanks send journalists a report which includes flawed research, which is then written up in the paper.
Twitter, now X, spent the best part of a decade marketing itself as a town square where people could have a voice, be heard, and connect with others who shared their views from around the world. Ours is not the place to find a sharp analysis of what’s changed under new owner Elon Musk, but it is noticeable that many of the experts we followed on the platform have simply left. As with any vacuum in nature, it has been filled: the majority of the loudest accounts are not experts on their given issue. This is a net negative for the wider UK-China space in my view, and leads to a compounding echo chamber.
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CONCLUSION
“It had been a failure, but it was a failure he understood, and that made it a victory.”
James S. A. Corey
We stand at a critical juncture on the cusp of 2024. This year has brought progress in diplomacy and legislation, but these actions lack the backbone of a unified, overarching strategy; it's akin to navigating a ship in stormy waters with an incomplete map. As 2024 arrives, capability building will probably fall down the political agenda, to the cost of all of us operating in this space. If it does, there will be repercussions in the future.
The UK-China bilateral has existed for centuries before us, and will exist for centuries after. What we do here is provide a snapshot of the present, and try and provide a horizon scan of what we think may happen in the short to medium term. This involves aggregating hundreds of conversations, coffees, dinners, research notes, reports, visits and walks a year into one succinct research briefing note a week. We sit outside all normal structures: not in Parliament, not in Whitehall, not from the City, not really a media company either. Building the UK’s China capabilities is our primary aim here. Over the last year alone, nearly half a million people across 139 countries have read these notes, and a number of companies now pay a flat fee of £10,000 a year for our research reports. Without them, we wouldn’t be able to do what we do.
I wasn’t born in the United Kingdom. I came as a wee boy, and have always felt like I hover on the periphery of understanding the society and structures that I’m part of. When it comes to Beijing to Britain, this approach helps shape much of my thinking, and I hope the work and effort we put into this product helps to move the conversation forward for Government, business and the wider space. I’m always keen to talk to people who share that interest, so please do get in touch.
Have a lovely New Year.
- Sam Hogg, Founder