EU's China Strategy, UK in South Korea and Japan, new GCHQ head
A Beijing to Britain briefing
Hello,
French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent trip to China appears to have made him few friends in the West. Manu’s remarks suggest his strategy is to turn Europe into a “third superpower” in the ongoing competition between the United States and China, and not be drawn into following Washington’s lead on some matters. His comments on Taiwan and praise for the Franco-Sino relationship sent parts of Twitter into meltdown, and drew particular ire from Western commentators; Gideon Rachman responded in The Financial Times that “the attitudes of European politicians such as Macron matter, since they will affect Chinese calculations of the economic and diplomatic costs of any attack.” Rhodium Group’s Noah Barkin provided the most astute analysis, noting that "Macron received not a single concession from Xi on Ukraine, the issue he cared about most” but instead “offered China’s leader one rhetorical gift after another, undermining a fragile European and transatlantic consensus on China." On the opposing side, Gérard Araud, France’s former Ambassador to the United States and United Nations, hit back: “Do you really think that most Europeans are keen on following the US in confronting China? Have you asked the Italians, the Spaniards, the Germans etc. not the English speaking think tankers but the real ones?”
Macron’s speech is an anomaly when compared to that of three other recent speeches from key European figures. President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen’s firm speech on China less than a fortnight prior is the most useful thing for readers to digest, setting out a comprehensive ‘de-risking’ strategy. Josep Borrell, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and her VP, was meant to be in China this week but caught Covid-19. His scheduled speech too highlighted his concerns, noting that although he was not planning on lecturing China, with regard to Russia, “[n]eutrality in the face of the violation of international law is not credible. We do not ask anyone to align with our own position. We simply ask to admit and recognise that in this case there was a serious violation of international law.” Finally, Germany’s Foreign Minister, Annalena Baerbock, delivered a warning to Beijing that "[a] military escalation in the Taiwan Strait, through which 50 percent of world trade flows every day, would be a horror scenario for the entire world”, and "[c]onflicts can only be resolved peacefully. A unilateral and violent change in the status quo would not be acceptable to us as Europeans."
As usual, there was a puzzling lack of curiosity in Western media and policymaking circles as to what the rest of the world outside of Brussels, London or Washington thought of Macron’s comments, especially those throughout Southeast Asia. Perhaps many of the members of this diverse crew of nations, referred to of late as “non-aligned countries”, did not care; perhaps they viewed it as another episode of Western bloc infighting. Who knows. An equally limited response came with Brazil’s President visit to China. Lula’s supporting call for developing nations to work towards replacing the US dollar with their own currencies in international trade was met with radio silence across most of Fleet Street. Comparatively, Macron’s speech received back-to-back coverage for days. Ultimately, in a world increasingly split into three rough camps - China, the West, and the rest of the world of non-aligned countries - it’s going to be critical for policymakers to know how members of that final camp think, and incumbent for the media to realise their role in covering it.
— Sam Hogg, Editor
In this week’s Briefing Note, we look at:
Three major British trips across the Indo Pacific
A Parliamentary briefing on UK aid to China
MI5’s warning to Government about Chinese spies using third country passports
The latest output from the IMF and World Bank on supply chains and China
HSBC and others under fire from UK MPs and activists