NEW ANALYSIS: Two Chinese analysts discuss "the Security Strategy of the UK"
A Beijing to Britain and Sinification crossover post
Hello,
Beijing to Britain was pleased to write the introduction to this translation and assessment by the excellent
, featuring guest analysis from Chinese analysts Yang Fang and Qu Bing.What follows is our short introductory review of the analysis, and then Sinification’s translation of Yang and Qu’s work.
Introduction
The British establishment spends an increasingly significant amount of time thinking about China. How do we understand the Communist Party’s strategic aims under General Secretary Xi Jinping? How do we work with international partners to engage with China, or limit its powers in certain arenas? What areas should we be allocating more resources to, and why? How do we attempt to navigate the US-China relationship in a way that protects our economy and sovereign ambitions?
As Chinese analysts Yang Fang and Qu Bing outline in this essay, the Integrated Review and the consequent refresh published two years later go some of the way to answering these questions. Some of their observations are perhaps too harsh: a focus on the US-UK bilateral relationship dominates part of their analysis, while the UK’s push (alongside the US) to invest in relationships throughout the Indo-Pacific go largely unremarked upon. A number of Westminster readers may also argue that the UK’s leadership in areas such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) safety show a willingness to marry a security-first approach with a pragmatic assessment of the benefits the technology can bring.
Yet a number of observations strike uncomfortably close to the bone. Successive British governments’ habit of pursuing short-termism is a strategic risk, and one that is well documented (but perhaps a feature of 21st century democracies, as former National Security Adviser Lord Ricketts recently observed). Should they win the next General Election, the Labour Party’s apparent plans to rewrite parts of the Integrated Review would see its third revision in almost as many years - not ideal for a document that was meant to set the foreign policy foundations for the next decade.
Ultimately, it is always worth understanding how other nations think about our country, particularly when that nation is a global power like the PRC. Seeing your country through the eyes of another creates the opportunity to spot things that may be overlooked, or areas that don’t receive enough positive attention. It is only by challenging our strategic thinking that we can begin to confirm we are getting it right.
— Sam Hogg, Editor of Beijing to Britain
Summary
Historically, the UK has been known for its ability to assess global risks, form coherent strategic plans and maintain a flexible position between its alliances and political independence.
However, in a precarious post-Brexit era marked by a weak economy, political instability and “chronic short-termism”, Britain has largely failed to come up with a consistent, workable and relatively independent long-term national security strategy.
Britain’s rising sense of insecurity and pessimism towards global developments are pushing it towards the “securitisation” of more and more aspects of its domestic and foreign policies.
The UK’s national security strategy suffers from a number of limitations:
A lack of hard power and financial resources.
A lack of consistency and of a detailed road map.
An increasing alignment with, and dependence on, the US.
Declining soft power and international status.
Frequent changes of government and policy reversals.
The most recent update to its national security strategy (the Integrated Review Refresh 2023) demonstrates a deficit of “self-confidence”, “dynamism” and “initiative”. Although Britain may wax eloquent about its ambitions, its approach will probably fail.
The Authors
Qu Bing (曲兵, left): Deputy director of the Institute of European Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)
Yang Fang (杨芳, right): Head of the British Studies Department, Institute of European Studies, CICIR
CICIR: A key Chinese think tank affiliated with the PRC’s Ministry of State Security
THE EVOLUTION, ADJUSTMENT, AND LIMITATIONS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM’S SECURITY STRATEGY (EXCERPTS)
Qu Bing (曲兵) and Yang Fang (杨芳)
China Security Studies (国家安全研究) No. 3 – June 2023
Translated and summarised by Daniel Crain for Sinification
Subscribe
1. “[The UK's] Rising Insecurity and [its] Increasingly Negative Strategic Outlook”:
“[In terms of security and diplomacy,] the UK is a great power with a global perspective. As such, its security strategy has always emphasised international risk assessment and strategic foresight. Before 2023, the titles of [its national security and defence] reports reflected a certain amount of strategic self-confidence and dynamism: ‘Security in an Interdependent World [2008], ‘A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty [2010]’, ‘A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom [2015]’ and ‘Global Britain in a Competitive Age [2021]’. However, its 2023 defence strategy, 'Responding to a More Contested and Volatile World,’ was not only written in a gloomier and more pessimistic tone, but also lacks any strategic declaration on Britain’s global role. This updated report views today's world as more dangerous, chaotic and divided. [Coupled with] the accelerating trends towards multipolarity, fragmentation and fierce competition, it predicts that such heightened volatility may continue into the 2030s.”
“Correspondingly, the United Kingdom has also become more concerned with its ‘strategic vulnerabilities [战略脆弱性]’ in such areas as the economy, society, technology and infrastructure. It has made these the focus of its strategic capacity-building. The growing complexity of the [UK’s] threat landscape [威胁图景], coupled with the uncertainty surrounding its own development has given rise to a sense of insecurity. This will continue to influence the development of Britain's national security strategy for some time to come.”
2. “Everything is Security and Security is Everywhere”:
“In particular, the UK’s post-Brexit development has become more precarious. Different governments at different times have held overarching security strategies with contrasting styles and emphases. However, a growing emphasis on national security [‘大安全’路线], international cooperation and efficiency maximisation will [remain] its main strategic priorities [战略偏好]. It may even move towards ‘pan-securitisation [泛安全化]’, a state of affairs where ‘everything is security and security is everywhere [一切皆是安全, 安全无处不在]’.” [Note: Qu and Yang appear to be adapting an expression used by British analyst Paul Cornish – who they cite extensively throughout their article – and who recently likened Britain’s Integrated Review Refresh 2023 to the title of the 2022 film, 'Everything Everywhere All at Once']
“This preference for a strategy tilted towards ‘comprehensive national security [大安全]’ has brought about changes to the UK’s style of governance and decision-making. In the post-Brexit era, the promotion of various domestic and foreign policies in the name of national security, using the law as a yardstick and [particular] issues as leverage points [以法律为准绳,以问题为抓手], has become an important feature of Tory governance. With regard to future domestic policies, the UK government will continue to roll out security-related strategies and legislation in a variety of different fields. In the name of 'national security', it will increase its intervention in various areas, including politics, trade, finance, and even science, technology, education and so on. In terms of its foreign policy, the UK is set to place greater emphasis on ‘security [and defence] diplomacy [安全外交]’. Whether it is working closely with allies or developing more extensive relationships with partners, the UK is set to give greater prominence to security issues and deepen its involvement in NATO as well as other multilateral security organisations.”
3. “The Stability and Continuity of [Britain’s] Strategic Framework”:
“When compared with the 2021 Integrated Review, its update [i.e. the Integrated Review Refresh 2023] maintains continuity with regard to enhancing deterrence, addressing interstate competition, increasing resilience and promoting sustainable development capacity-building through [the use of new] technologies and so on. This clearly defines the priorities of the UK's national security strategy.”
4. “A Strategic Approach That Tends Towards Pragmatism, [but] With Growing ‘Protectionist’ Overtones”:
“In a number of areas, the updated Integrated Review reflects a return to a pragmatic [实用主义] British national security strategy. In terms of its overall strategic positioning, Global Britain – the centrepiece of the Johnson government’s national security strategy – has been abandoned.”
“With regard to the conceptualisation of security, [the Integrated Review] recognises that complete 'security' [完全的'安全'] is difficult to achieve and puts greater emphasis on early warning risk assessment and crisis prevention. It also focuses on strengthening its ability to recover from shocks (‘resilience’) [Note: parentheses are Yang and Qu’s].”
“Domestically, the UK is set to adopt a whole-of-society approach to risk management [全社会的风险应对模式]. Internationally, it will [continue to] advocate 'strategic convergence [战略趋同] with its supposed allies and partners. This will be particularly relevant when dealing with complex and sensitive international issues as well as great power competition. [Such an approach] aims to share risks and expand Britain’s strategic influence.”
5. “Strategic Limitations of the UK’s National Security Strategy”
“A comprehensive examination of the historical evolution and adjustment of Britain's national security strategy reveals some long-unresolved structural problems. New problems have even arisen. This highlights the limitations in the development of the UK’s national security strategy.”
“Limitation Number 1: Insufficient Funds and Hard-Power Resources to Support [its National Security Strategy]”
“In regard to its lack of hard power, it is unclear whether or not the British government has the political vision, honesty and courage to make real-world strategic decisions. It is [likewise] difficult to determine if it can construct a credible deterrence framework as well as a stable budget that are in line with its strategic choices. If such issues continue to be avoided, Britain's national security will clearly be on a dangerous and failing strategic trajectory.”
“Limitation Number 2: Self-contradictions and Strategic Decline”
“[The UK’s] national security strategy increasingly lacks a consistent link between its goals, methods and approach. It also fails to reflect how the government will integrate its [proposed] policies strategically. Therefore, this [report] does not resemble a traditional strategy document so much as the political manifestos and the like that one might find in an electoral campaign.”
“Limitation Number 3: Imbalanced Alliances and the Weakening of Strategic Independence”
“The UK's current national security strategy increasingly emphasises ‘alignment with allies [与盟友一致]’. This is especially true in regard to its most important ally, the United States. Under the weight of heavy interference from Washington, Britain’s strategy has been shifting ever more closely to that of the US. It has strengthened its interdependence [联动性] with American policies and has even gone so far as to reverse [some of its] policies as a result of Washington’s direct pressure. The post-WWII Anglo-American 'special relationship’ has never been an equal one. However, the UK has long positioned itself as a ‘borrower’ [借力] rather than a ‘follower.’ It would make strategic adjustments when this 'special relationship’ failed to support, or even served to undermine, British interests. As such, the UK, despite its declining strength, could still play a unique role on many issues. For example, after the Iraq War, the UK was continuously striving to find a balance [between British and American interests]. From Downing Street to Westminster, and even down to think tanks and the [British] media, all reassessed the United Kingdom's policy towards the United States.”
“However, Brexit seriously impacted the stability of the UK’s development. Meanwhile, the US government, parliamentarians and think tanks stepped up their intervention and lobbying in a deeply troubled UK on [issues ranging from] Brexit and the status of Northern Ireland to the UK’s China policy. At a time when the UK's domestic political forces were fragmented, polarised and at their weakest, this helped strengthen Britain’s [pro-US] transatlantic camp and changed the UK’s previous habit of 'rebalancing' [再平衡] its relationship with the US. [Today,] security cooperation is at the core of the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’. [Furthermore,] cooperation in such areas as defence, intelligence, law enforcement or counterterrorism has strengthened their ‘special relationship’.”
“Under the great changes [not seen] in a century and in the face of global challenges, the fixed mindset of, and reliance on, ‘sticking closely to the US [贴靠美国]’ is a sign of strategic rigidity and weakness. In practice, it has not made the UK safer, more prosperous or more stable. For example, post-Brexit Britain has been desperate to sign a free trade agreement with the US. However, the US has not expressed much interest [in this]. Should Britain’s strategic independence continue to decline, not only would this go counter to its national interest, but it would also further weaken the UK strategically. The UK’s security policy of ‘alignment with allies’ can only cover up, but not change, Britain’s predicament of strategic passivity. The same holds true in regard to the [UK’s] targeting [锁定] of ‘common enemies [共同的敌人]’, when it pursues absurd, oft-repeated stories which then become fact [追求‘三人成虎’], when there are actually no real threats [没有‘真虎’].” [Note: The Chinese idiom 三人成虎 or “three men talking makes a tiger” can be likened to fallacious forms of reasoning like the illusory truth effect or the bandwagon effect. In other words, a repeated rumour such as the reported presence of a tiger in a city can easily become an accepted fact if just a few people claim to have seen the tiger.]
“In other words, as world instability increases and as threats, dangers, and challenges grow ever more complex and intertwined, the last thing Britain needs is an illusion of certainty [确定性的伪装]. ‘The point is that we are all capable of believing things that we know to be untrue and then, when we are finally proved wrong, impudently twisting the facts so as to show that we were right. Intellectually, it is possible to carry on this process for an indefinite time: the only check on it is that sooner or later a false belief bumps up against solid reality'.” [Note: Qu and Yang are using a George Orwell quote, which they found cited in a 2021 report by Paul Cornish]
“Limitation Number 4: Damaged Soft Power and Declining International Credibility”
“Since the 2016 Brexit referendum, the UK has strengthened its ‘pledge [承诺]’ to involve itself more deeply in global affairs. However, it has come up against numerous difficulties in its attempt to put this into practice. For example, its withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan has been widely dubbed the 'Kabul debacle [喀布尔大溃败]' in the UK. A report by the UK’s Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee described it as 'a disaster and a betrayal of our allies that will damage the UK’s interests for years to come’. The hard and soft power that had long been the pride of both Britain and the US were challenged.”
“At the same time, how well a country can safeguard its national security ultimately depends upon its ability to govern, which in its turn is based on its economy. As the British scholar John Kampfner puts it, 'can [the UK] have a global foreign and security policy based on a sickly economy? […] External credibility depends on internal competence—on immigration, skills, health provision, pollution, transport and other areas where Britain is currently struggling’.” [Note: Qu and Yang include the UK’s territorial integrity in this list, but we have decided to use Kampfner’s original wording here which differs slightly from the quote used by the authors]
“Limitation Number 5: The Existence of Chronic ‘Short-termism [短期主义]'”
“The UK’s next general election will be held in January 2025 at the latest. The Labour Party has already said that if it comes to power in 2025, it would revise the UK’s national security strategy. In addition to political instability, policy reversals have become a significant feature of British governance in recent years. Even if the Tories were to remain in power, maintaining effective, long-term policies will be very difficult. The fact that [the concept of] 'Global Britain' disappeared within two years, without even being replaced by another umbrella slogan, is the latest example of this. One could interpret this as a reflection of the ‘flexibility [灵活性]’ of British strategies, but it is also possible to view this as a type of ‘short-termism [短期主义]’.”
“Britain’s national security strategy emphasises foresight and prevention. However, reactive adjustments and an inability to guard itself against all threats [防不胜防] are its defining characteristics. Thus, at a time when the UK lacks stable governance and in an era of great [global] changes, it is reasonable to wonder how a Britain with diminished strategic initiative can possibly have an effective, long-term national security strategy?”
Subscribe to Sinification.
Excellent post 👍